Introduction
There has been no major advance in psychopharmacology for over 40 years. Moreover, repeated and expensive failures have resulted in many pharmaceutical companies scaling down drug discovery in psychiatry or abandoning it altogether (Abbott, 2011) . This is generally attributed to our poor understanding of disease mechanisms. The complexity and inaccessibility of the brain compared to other organs, and the difficulties inherent in modeling complex human systems and behaviors experimentally, certainly pose challenges. On the other hand, advances in genomics, stem cell biology, and neuroscience potentially place us in an unprecedentedly strong position to tackle major psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (McCarroll and Hyman, 2013) .
But researchers hoping to understand these disorders face another challenge. This arises from the fact that, because we understand so little about disease mechanisms, our approach to diagnosis remains largely descriptive and syndromic; what we recognize as disorders are actually syndromes: constellations of signs and symptoms that tend to occur together. Recognition of these syndromes helps clinicians constrain the range of likely outcomes, choose treatments, and communicate with each other and with patients and their families. As far as research is concerned, it has generally been assumed that current diagnoses, imperfect as we suspect them to be, are nevertheless the best basis we have for understanding etiology and pathogenesis. As we acquire new knowledge from epidemiology, genetics, and neuroscience, so the argument goes, we will be able to refine these categories and develop new treatments, diagnostic tests, and biomarkers that will place psychiatry on a par with other branches of medicine. But recently another view has been gaining support. Perhaps our tendency to view research findings through the primitive syndromic lens of current diagnoses is actually impeding progress. Perhaps we need to try new ways of classifying psychiatric disorders if we are ever going to benefit from advances in neuroscience and develop more effective treatments.
Psychiatric Diagnosis: Reliability at the Expense of Validity Current approaches to psychiatric diagnosis grew out of the appreciation in the early 1960s that the rate with which schizophrenia was being diagnosed in the US was 5-20 times greater than that in the UK (Cooper et al., 1972) . Work over that decade showed that this reflected diagnostic differences rather than real differences in prevalence and pointed to the need for diagnostic standardization. This led to the development of operationalized classifications that were designed to provide a reliable way of assigning a patient with a particular constellation of signs and symptoms to a diagnostic category (Allardyce et al., 2007) . This works by defining a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria for each category. A ''polythetic'' approach is taken such that multiple positive features are identified but none is regarded as essential; in order to make a diagnosis it is simply necessary to check the clinical features against the list of criteria. The main benefit of this ''Chinese menu'' approach is to greatly improve diagnostic reliability. In other words, different clinicians should make the same diagnosis of a given case assuming that they have been equally assiduous in eliciting the signs and symptoms. These approaches were developed to remedy a lack of diagnostic reliability and in this regard their introduction has had many benefits to clinical practice and to the collection of data on prevalence and incidence (Kendell and Jablensky, 2003) . However, in the absence of a solid understanding of pathophysiology, the majority of diagnostic categories chosen were by necessity largely descriptive and syndromic in nature. They are in effect an operationalization of expert consensus of the best descriptors of the clinical syndromes recognized by psychiatrists; they were not, nor were intended to be, valid descriptors of disease entities. The precise meaning of the concept of validity as applied to psychiatric diagnosis has been debated (Kendell and Jablensky, 2003) , but for current purposes we can consider it as referring to the degree to which a diagnostic construct delineates a group of cases that share common underlying etiological and/or pathogenic processes (Allardyce et al., 2007) . Applying this test, few diagnostic categories in psychiatry would generally be accepted as valid. Many of these designate causes of intellectual disability or dementia such as Down syndrome, phenylketonuria, Huntington's disease, and JakobCreutzfeldt disease (Kendell and Jablensky, 2003) . In the case of the majority of psychiatric disorders, where etiology and pathogenesis remain largely unknown, the validity of the syndromic concepts that form the basis of current diagnostic criteria is questionable (Kendell and Jablensky, 2003; Craddock and Owen, 2005; Allardyce et al., 2007) .
Most western clinicians use either the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) or the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) of the World Health Organization (International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 1992) . These are updated every decade or so but, while hopes are frequently expressed that diagnoses will be modified on the basis of new insights into etiology and pathogenesis, the weight of evidence has largely been insufficient to justify radical overhaul. Lack of validity was widely recognized when these operationalized systems were developed, but their convenience and reliability were such that this significant shortcoming soon became overlooked. This has led to a process of ''reification'' whereby researchers, practitioners, and regulators have come to regard psychiatric diagnoses as valid categories defining distinct illnesses with their own characteristic underlying etiology and pathogenesis (Kendell and Jablensky, 2003; Hyman, 2010) .
Psychiatric Diagnoses Are Both Too Broad and Too Narrow
The limitations of classifying psychiatric disorders using this categorical and syndromic approach have become increasingly apparent in recent years (Craddock and Owen, 2010) . Indeed, many current diagnoses would appear to have the unusual property of being simultaneously both too broad and too narrow. They are too broad in the sense that patients with the same diagnosis can vary widely in symptoms, severity, course, and outcome. For example, people with quite widely different symptom profiles can satisfy DSM5 criteria for schizophrenia (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) . Moreover, a diagnosis of schizophrenia is associated with a wide range of outcomes ranging from essentially full recovery to chronic symptoms and disability (van Os and Kapur, 2009) . It is often assumed that, with further research, it will be possible to resolve this heterogeneity into specific, valid disease subtypes. Yet, repeated attempts to do this convincingly using a variety of features have failed. Current diagnoses are too narrow because many diagnoses have symptoms in common and the boundaries between disorders are frequently indistinct and to a great extent arbitrary as are the boundaries between disorder and wellness. For example, psychotic symptoms, particularly delusions and hallucinations, as well as episodes of affective disturbance, are commonly seen in both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (Craddock and Owen, 2005) . The overlap of symptoms between diagnostic categories means that it is often difficult to assign an individual to a single specific category, and the diagnosis given to a particular patient may change over time (Craddock and Owen, 2005) . One approach to this problem has been to recognize ''interforms,'' such as ''schizoaffective disorder,'' in which features of schizophrenia and severe mood disorder occur in the same individual (Heckers, 2009) . A second approach is to recognize ''comorbidity,'' whereby a patient is diagnosed with more than one disorder. This may be clinically useful but raises questions about the validity of the diagnostic categories being employed. Moreover, comorbidity is often obscured in research studies by the use of diagnostic hierarchies or exclusions. For example, until the most recent edition of DSM (DSM5) was published (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), it was not possible to diagnose ADHD and autism in the same individual. Yet in population studies these two syndromes frequently cooccur (Simonoff et al., 2008; Lee and Ousley, 2006) . Finally, not only are the boundaries between established diagnostic categories indistinct at best, but so also are the boundaries between illness and wellness (Narrow and Kuhl, 2011) . This might seem obvious in instances such as depression and anxiety that are widely recognized at different degrees of severity in many of us. However, there is increasing realization that even psychotic symptoms, such as auditory hallucinations and paranoid thinking, occur in attenuated form in the 5%-8% of the healthy population ).
Impact of Recent Genetic Findings: Complexity and Pleiotropy
Genomic analysis of psychiatric disorders remains a work in progress; much genetic risk is still unexplained at the level of the genome, and progress has been greater for some disorders, in particular autism and schizophrenia, than others (Sullivan et al., 2012) . However, empirical findings from those disorders with sufficient data now support a general framework for the genetic architecture of psychiatric disorders. As expected from genetic epidemiology and population genetics, it appears that a spectrum of allelic risk underlies complex psychiatric traits as for other common diseases (Sullivan et al., 2012) . There are contributions from alleles that are common in the population but whose effect sizes tend to be small due to the effects of natural selection, as well as from rare alleles, some of which can have a large effect on disease risk pending their removal from the population by selection (Sullivan et al., 2012; Gaugler et al., 2014 ). The precise genetic architectures of different psychiatric disorders remains to be determined pending larger and more detailed studies. However, findings to date are sufficient to yield two important implications for classification and for psychiatric neuroscience more widely. The first of these is that the disorders are highly polygenic with hundreds of risk variants involved at a population level (Sullivan et al., 2012) . In schizophrenia, where the largest samples have been studied and our understanding is therefore greatest, genome-wide association studies (GWAS) have identified to date over 100 distinct genetic loci harboring relatively common alleles of small effect at robust, ''genome-wide'' levels of statistical significance (Schizophrenia Working Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2014). Furthermore, studies looking at the en masse effects of common risk alleles that are not individually supported at genome-wide levels of statistical significance have estimated that relatively common small-effect alleles account for at least 25% of total liability to schizophrenia (about 33% of genetic Neuron 84, November 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 565 Neuron Perspective liability) (Sullivan et al., 2012) . Similar studies in autism also support a substantial contribution of common small-effect alleles en masse (Lee et al., 2013) . This implies that many specific loci remain to be identified at robust levels of statistical significance and implies that the so-called ''missing heritability'' may be merely hidden by the limitations of current technology (Sullivan et al., 2012) . This high level of genetic complexity means that individuals, even those without a disorder, will carry a large number of risk alleles and that levels of genetic heterogeneity among those affected will be high: individuals with the same disorder, even those who are closely related, will be likely to have a different complement of risk alleles.
The second important implication of recent studies is that genetic risk doesn't map onto our current definitions of disease. Indeed, the findings point to extensive pleiotropy with respect to diagnosis. GWAS have found evidence for overlap of common alleles at the level of individual single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), genes, and the en masse effects of multiple common risk alleles (Sullivan et al., 2012) . A recent study (Lee et al., 2013) found evidence for significant sharing of the relatively common risk variants that are tagged in GWAS between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder, schizophrenia and major depressive disorder, ADHD and major depressive disorder, and, to a lesser extent, schizophrenia and ASD.
Extensive pleiotropy has also been observed in the effects of rare risk alleles that individually confer much larger effects on risk than common alleles. Chromosomal copy-number variants (CNVs) have been found to confer risk of schizophrenia and a range of childhood neurodevelopmental disorders such as ASD, intellectual disability (ID), and ADHD, as well as other phenotypes such as generalized epilepsy (Owen et al., 2011; Malhotra and Sebat, 2012) . There is also evidence for cross-disorder genetic effects from family studies (Owen et al., 2011) , as well as from a recent study of small de novo mutations affecting one or a few nucleotides (Fromer et al., 2014) . This latter study demonstrated shared etiological overlap between schizophrenia, ASD, and ID at the resolution not just of loci or even individual genes, but also of mutations with similar functional impacts. It is worth noting at this point that the spectrum of phenotypes associated with these rare mutations is remarkably similar to the range of outcomes seen after obstetric complications and other factors such as maternal infection and poor prenatal nutrition, which are associated with early cerebral insult, and that have been consistently implicated as environmental risk factors for neurodevelopmental disorders (Pasamanick et al., 1956) .
We have emphasized findings that suggest shared susceptibility across traditional diagnostic categories. However, it is important to recognize that relatively nonspecific risk factors, which apply to a wide variety of cases, will be easier to identify than those associated with more specific outcomes. There is evidence from both family and genomic studies for risk alleles with differential effects on schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (Craddock and Owen, 2010; Ruderfer et al., 2014) and also for alleles that have a degree of specificity to more specific clinical phenotypes that are not recognized by current diagnostic categories (Craddock et al., 2010) . Another example comes from the mounting evidence that large, rare CNVs are more prevalent in schizophrenia than in bipolar disorder (Grozeva et al., 2010) . It seems likely, therefore, that, with more research, we can expect to identify risk alleles with varying degrees of specificity. The key question, as we shall see below, is not whether current diagnoses define groups of cases that have more in common in pathogenesis and pathophysiology than chance (it seems highly likely that do), but whether these are the best phenotypes for research aiming to chart the course between genetic risk and clinical outcome and best understand pathophysiology.
Where We Are Now We can draw two fairly clear conclusions about the limitations of current diagnostic approaches as tools for research. First, recent genetic findings have crystalized longstanding concerns (Kendell and Jablensky, 2003) about the lack of the validity of psychiatric classification. Current diagnoses were not designed to group patients neatly into sets with the same pathogenic mechanism or mechanisms, nor necessarily to distinguish groups in which different mechanisms are at play. Unfortunately, their utility and widespread use in the clinic have come to obscure their lack of validity. The relationships between the syndromes observed in the clinic and underlying disturbances of brain function are far from simple, and we should not be surprised that attempts to map current diagnostic categories onto specific disturbances in psychological and neurobiological function have largely failed. For example, despite extensive research over nearly two decades, neuroimaging has failed to identify a single parameter of biomarker quality that can distinguish patients with a particular mental disorder from controls let alone distinguish between different mental disorders (Linden, 2012) . Second, the implication of very large numbers of relatively common genetic risk alleles, many of which are pleiotropic, accords well with the fuzzy boundaries of current diagnoses noted above. It suggests that we are dealing with traits that are best conceived of as continuous rather than categorical at both the phenotypic and genotypic levels. Attempts to identify mendelian forms of psychiatric disorders have been largely unsuccessful (Sullivan et al., 2012) and rather than dealing with a set of one-to-one relationships between genotype and phenotype it would appear that we are dealing with multiple risk alleles, many of which will be associated with a variety of outcomes as determined by the combinatorial effects of other risk alleles, the environment, and doubtless chance. These observations lead to the conclusion that, as well as being insufficiently grounded in disease biology, a major weakness of our current approach to classification, at least as far as much research is concerned, may be that it is categorical rather than dimensional.
How Can We Do Things Better?
Some might think it odd for a psychiatric geneticist to be calling for new approaches to diagnosis. After all, hasn't genomics succeeded in identifying risk alleles despite, if not because, of current diagnosis? Genetics has succeeded to the extent it has because its methods are highly scalable, because researchers have collaborated to put together adequately powered studies, and because the field now demands high standards of statistical rigor and replication (Sullivan et al., 2012) . The robust identification of risk alleles in the face of pleiotropy and extensive heterogeneity has been a triumph of brute force and collectivism over diagnostic imprecision. However, as we have noted, it is easier to identify alleles with a broad spectrum of risk compared to those associated with more circumscribed outcomes. It is likely that studies over the next 5-10 years using increasingly large samples and new genomic technologies will identify more risk alleles at greater degrees of certainty and this will help us implicate biological mechanisms (McCarroll and Hyman, 2013) . However, if we wish to understand what makes patients differ from each other in symptoms, course, and outcome, and how genetic risk impacts on specific abnormalities of brain function leading to symptoms of disorder, we will need new ways of stratifying patients for research.
It's relatively easy to point out the shortcomings of current approaches but more difficult to identify a better system and even more difficult to persuade researchers to abandon the comfort of familiar diagnostic habits. So while many agree that new approaches are needed, the way forward is more contentious (see Editorial by Maj, 2014 and associated articles). There is, however, broad agreement on three principles. First, there should be an increasing emphasis on studies that do not stratify solely by current diagnostic category as defined by DSM or ICD. For example, these might select cases that share specific clinical symptoms or risk factors but who have different categorical diagnoses or select those who form a subgroup of a current diagnostic category as defined by particular features. Second, in acknowledgment of the continuous nature of psychiatric phenotypes, there should be an increasing focus on dimensional measures of psychopathology as well as of underlying brain dysfunction. Third, in relating psychopathology to underlying mechanisms, studies should seek intermediate phenotypes that provide measures of underlying pathophysiology and, where possible, these should access established brain-behavior relationships. These intermediate phenotypes (also known as endophenotypes) might involve measures of neurocognition, neuroimaging, or electrophysiology.
This philosophy has been articulated, developed, and actioned in NIMH's Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013 ; http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/ rdoc/index.shtml), which seems set to be a game changer at least for psychiatric research in the U.S. (Doherty and Owen, 2014) . Until recently it was virtually mandatory to use either DSM or ICD criteria in research grants and papers. Now, by implementing RDoC, NIMH (the major government funder of psychiatric research in the U.S.) is attempting to reorientate U.S. research away from current diagnostic categories. RDoC is built around the principle that mental disorders are best viewed as disorders involving brain circuits. It aims to define the basic dimensions of dysfunction that cut across, or subdivide, disorders as traditionally categorized in order to develop new ways of classifying psychopathology based on domains of observable behavior and their relationship to markers of potential underlying causes and mechanisms. As such it is a framework for future research on psychopathology. It is certainly not, nor claimed to be, a new diagnostic system that is nearly ready for introduction to the clinic (Cuthbert, 2014) .
RDoC is a dimensional system, which spans the range from normal to abnormal. It has been conceptualized as a matrix with four dimensions (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013; Cuthbert, 2014 ; http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/index. shtml): (1) domains of functioning (e.g., negative valence systems, positive valence systems, and cognitive systems), which are further subdivided into dimensional constructs (for example, cognitive systems are divided into attention, perception, working memory, declarative memory, language behavior, and cognitive control); (2) units of analysis (e.g., genes, molecules, cells, circuits, behavior); (3) developmental aspects (changes to the constructs over time); and (4) environmental aspects (how the environment affects and interacts with the constructs). The domains of functioning and the dimensional constructs contained within them have been selected based on current understanding of neural circuitry. The current matrix is seen as a work in progress the structure and content of which will be developed and refined as more evidence accumulates (Cuthbert, 2014) .
Put simply, RDoC seeks to encourage researchers to begin with current understandings of behavior-brain relationships and then link them to clinical phenomena, rather than starting with an illness definition and seeking its neurobiological underpinnings (Figure 1) . For example, patients could be chosen for study on the basis that they have a particular set of symptoms such as delusions and no constraints placed on their DSM diagnosis. The study might then focus on the relationship of reward prediction error to strength of delusional symptoms. Alternatively, patients might be selected because they have a particular risk factor such as a pathogenic CNV or a history of childhood abuse or trauma. The study might then focus upon delineating the range of responses to a set of cognitive paradigms as well as clinical symptoms.
A number of concerns have been raised about RDoC (Cuthbert, 2014; Doherty and Owen, 2014; Maj, 2014) , not least of which is that it appears to some to be too prescriptive given our currently limited understanding of brain-behavior relationships. However, its authors see it as a conceptual framework to encourage new thinking and capable of rapid evolution in the wake of new advances rather than a rigid new model. Initial anxieties that RDoC is intended to replace current DSM/ICD approaches in the clinic and that NIMH will immediately stop funding research using traditional diagnostic approaches have also largely dissipated (Doherty and Owen, 2014) . But this remains a bold and radical response by NIMH to the shortcomings of current classification for research and it will take a decade or more before its success or otherwise can be judged (Insel et al., 2010) .
Emptying the Bath but Keeping the Baby
This brings me on to what is, in my view, the most important criticism of RDoC at least in its most extreme manifestation in which DSM/ICD categories are off limits. This is that, in attempting, laudably, to break the constraints of current diagnostic approaches and put neuroscience at the center of psychiatric research, it has discarded what is known about the etiology of psychiatric syndromes and the differing degree of clinical similarity between them. For example, some disorders like ID are congenital, others like autism and ADHD tend to manifest Neuron 84, November 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 567 in childhood, and yet others like schizophrenia and bipolar disorder tend to present in adolescence or adulthood. Severe cognitive impairment is seen more frequently in autism than schizophrenia and is even less common in bipolar disorder (Craddock and Owen, 2005; Owen et al., 2011) . Increased rates of de novo CNVs and disruptive point mutations are found in ID and autism but are less prominent in schizophrenia (Kirov et al., 2012; Girirajan et al., 2011; Fromer et al., 2014) and even less so in bipolar disorder (Grozeva et al., 2010; Georgieva et al., 2014) . Schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are frequently hard to distinguish clinically from each other and typically show episodic courses (Craddock and Owen, 2010) whereas autism and ADHD frequently occur together. This is important information, which can be used to inform future neuroscience studies and help us generate hypotheses and prioritize work across diagnostic categories. It is possible to represent the relationship between current disorder categories in a way that makes sense of available etiological, clinical, and neuroscience data and that can act as a heuristic for future neuroscience-based research across diagnostic approaches as espoused in RDoC. This model (Craddock and Owen, 2010; Owen et al., 2011) integrates data from a number of sources to propose that psychiatric syndromes occupy a gradient with the syndromes ordered by decreasing relative contribution of genetically and environmentally induced neurodevelopmental impairment, with syndromic severity represented orthogonally (Figure 2 ). This approach accepts that current diagnostic approaches have some utility in defining groups of cases that are more closely related than chance. A key feature is that it regards current categorical diagnoses as arbitrary divisions of what is essentially a continuous landscape. This landscape is certainly multidimensional, but the model posits that the degree of neurodevelopmental impairment is a recognizable dimension. As shown in Figure 2 , this model makes predictions about the relative extent of brain dysfunction (number of structures and circuits affected) in the various clinical syndromes and the relationships and likely similarities between disorders. As such, it may provide a valuable heuristic around which clinical neuroscience and genomic studies, including those using the RDoC framework, can be designed.
This model is certainly an oversimplification but it has already proved useful in predicting the relative burden of large pathogenic CNVs in childhood neurodevelopmental and psychiatric disorders (Grozeva et al., 2010; Girirajan et al., 2011) . More recently, it predicted that the genes hit by de novo mutations Possible applications of the RDoC framework (see main text for further details). RDoC has been conceptualized as a matrix with four dimensions (Cuthbert and Insel 2013; Cuthbert 2014) : (1) domains of functioning, which are further subdivided into dimensional constructs; (2) units of analysis; (3) developmental aspects, and (4) environmental aspects. The domains of functioning and the dimensional constructs contained within them have been selected based on current understanding of neural circuitry. The figure shows two possible scenarios within the framework. In exemplar 1, patients are chosen for study on the basis that they have delusions and no constraints placed on their DSM diagnosis. The study might then focus on the relationship of reward prediction error to strength of delusional symptoms in an fMRI paradigm. In exemplar 2, patients are selected because they have a particular pathogenic CNV. The study then focuses upon delineating the range of responses to a set of cognitive paradigms as well as clinical symptoms. and the mutation sites themselves show the highest degree of evolutionary conservation (a proxy measure of functional importance) in ID, then ASD, with mutations in schizophrenia least conserved (Fromer et al., 2014) . It also predicted genetic findings for overlap between disorders at the level of biological systems (Grant, 2012; Fromer et al., 2014) .
Conclusions and Implications for Neuroscience
There is increasing recognition that current diagnostic approaches, while retaining their utility in the clinic, do not map onto underlying biology and are at odds with the continuous nature of psychiatric phenotypes. It seems clear that we cannot continue to rely on them as the basis for understanding the pathophysiology of these disorders or for developing and testing new treatments. There is, therefore, an urgent need for research that is not constrained by dogmatic adherence to DSM/ICD categories and that brings modern neuroscience to bear on intermediate phenotypes that index the pathophysiology underlying psychiatric symptoms. The degree of etiological complexity revealed by psychiatric genetics suggests that the application of these new, neuroscience-based approaches will require large studies, which in many instances will require both collaboration and methods that are scalable and standardized across centers as well as the assembly of data from deeply phenotyped cohorts to which many researchers can gain access (Insel et al., 2010) .
The high degree of polygenicity and pleiotropy seen in psychiatric phenotypes also poses challenges for basic neuroscientists seeking to study genetic risk in experimental systems. Complex genetic signals from a particular disorder, or group of disorders, can potentially be interpreted through their convergence on pathways or molecular networks (McCarroll and Hyman, 2013) , and there are encouraging signs of success for both autism (Berg and Geschwind, 2012) and schizophrenia (Hall et al., 2014) . Studies of this sort can implicate new targets for translational studies at network and pathway levels rather than at the level of individual genes (McCarroll and Hyman, 2013) , but the scope of this approach is limited by the fact that the functional annotation of much of the genome and proteome is less advanced for the brain than other tissues. We need shared resources that will provide information about transcriptomes, proteomes, and epigenomes for different brain regions and at different stages of development, as well as about protein interactions, if we are to close this ''annotation gap.'' Large-scale enterprises such as the Human Brain Project This simple model integrates data from a number of sources (Pasamanick et al., 1956; Craddock and Owen, 2010; Owen et al., 2011; Kirov et al., 2012; Girirajan et al., 2011; Fromer et al., 2014; Grozeva et al., 2010; Girirajan et al., 2011) to propose that psychiatric syndromes as currently classified occupy a gradient with the syndromes ordered by decreasing relative contribution of genetically and/or environmentally induced neurodevelopmental impairment. This indexes the number of structures and circuits that are affected, which in turn is manifest by the extent and degree of associated cognitive impairment. This approach accepts that current diagnostic approaches have some utility in defining groups of cases that are more closely related than chance. A key feature is that it regards current categorical diagnoses as arbitrary divisions of what is essentially a continuous landscape. This model makes predictions about the relative extent of brain dysfunction (number of structures and circuits affected) in the various clinical syndromes and the relationships and likely similarities between disorders. In the interests of clarity, this two-dimensional representation does not show the severity of individual syndromes. These are conceived as being orthogonal and as reflecting the severity, rather than the extent, of damage to structures and circuits. Further details and references are given in the text.
(https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/en_GB) offer medium-term solutions to this problem, but in the short term it should be possible to assemble such data from several hundred brains in multiple brain regions over different developmental periods.
Current translational paradigms aiming to understand the functional consequences of disease risk alleles were developed to study mendelian disorders, and we are going to need to find new, higher-throughput approaches if we are to translate findings from complex, polygenic disorders into biological and therapeutic insights (McCarroll and Hyman, 2013) . While there are few, if any, fully penetrant mendelian mutations identified for psychiatric disorders, the discovery of rare, highly penetrant mutations in autism and schizophrenia (Sullivan et al., 2012; Malhotra and Sebat, 2012; Kirov et al., 2012; Fromer et al., 2014) arguably offers the most tractable opportunities, but even here the range of associated outcomes in humans is wide and likely dependent on genetic background, which may be highly polygenic, as well as environmental factors. In the future, therefore, it will be necessary to study a range of variables that impact on outcomes in cellular and animal models of these mutations. Moreover, it will not be possible to conclude that any specific neurobiological or behavioral outcome maps onto a specific categorical disorder or human intermediate phenotype. Thus, in order to gain mechanistic insights into psychiatric disorders from even the relatively simple reagents provided by single highly penetrant mutations, it will be necessary to relate findings from animal and cellular systems directly to comparable findings from clinical neuroscience. Therefore, both clinical and basic neuroscientists will increasingly need to adopt translational measures of brain dysfunction and, ideally, work closely together to directly compare the effects of genetic and other risk variables on neurobiological function across levels of complexity.
